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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Seventh Circuit has a reputation for being “harshly critical” 
of attorneys—both in oral arguments and in written opinions—who 
fail to comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the 
Court’s Local Circuit Rules.1 Judge Richard Posner, in his opinion in 
Smoot v. Mazda Motors of America, asked the question: by sanctioning 
attorneys for relatively small rule violations, are the Seventh Circuit 
judges simply “being fusspots and nitpickers”?2  Whether the 
reputation is deserved, the practicing attorney in the Seventh Circuit 
has an incentive to follow both the federal rules and the court’s local 
rules—if the rules are ignored, or purposefully contravened, the 
attorney can be sure of a public rebuke in writing or before the Court 
during oral argument.3  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 See Howard Bashman, Have 7th Circuit Judges Gone off the Deep End?, 
LAW.COM, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1165582068191 (last visited Feb. 
9, 2009). The inspiration for this note was derived, in part, from Mr. Bashman’s 
commentary.  
2 469 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2006). 
3 See e.g. Ambati v. Reno, 2 F. App’x. 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Bagdade, 
334 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2003).  
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Smoot provides an interesting ground for discussion: is the 
Seventh Circuit more likely to sanction or discipline an attorney 
practicing before it than the rest of the Circuit Courts? Is this practice 
commonplace, or are the Seventh Circuit judges merely “nitpicking”?  
In Smoot, both Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ attorneys were 
reprimanded for failing to follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
28(a)(1), which requires all parties to submit a diversity statement 
when the case is before the Court on diversity grounds.4 After each 
party submitted appellate briefs which included deficient jurisdictional 
statements, the Court ordered the attorneys to submit supplemental 
jurisdictional statements which properly laid out the grounds for 
diversity jurisdiction.5 Unfortunately, neither party properly alleged 
sufficient grounds for diversity jurisdiction in their supplemental 
jurisdictional statements.6 
The attorneys’ failure to file adequate jurisdictional statements 
was addressed in the opinion.7 As for the court’s rationale, it 
explained: 
 
We have been plagued by the carelessness of a number of the 
lawyers practicing before the courts of this circuit with regard to 
the required contents of jurisdictional statements in diversity 
cases. It is time ... that this malpractice stopped. We direct the 
parties to show cause within 10 days why counsel should not be 
sanctioned for violating Rule 28(a)(1) and mistaking the 
requirements of diversity jurisdiction. We ask them to consider 
specifically the appropriateness, as a sanction, of their being 
                                                 
4 Smoot, 469 F.3d at 676; FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(1).  
5 See Smoot v. Mazda Motors of America, No. 01-3006 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2005) 
(Docket Entry of Nov. 29, 2006).  
6 Smoot, 469 F.3d at 676. Plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement claimed that the 
amount in controversy was equal to rather than in excess of the statutory requirement 
for diversity jurisdiction. Id. Both parties’ jurisdictional statements failed to 
adequately explain the diversity of citizenship requirement for diversity jurisdiction. 
Id.  
7 Id. at 676-77.  
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compelled to attend a continuing legal education class in federal 
jurisdiction.8  
 
 After a relatively lengthy discussion before reaching the merits, 
the Court decided that whether the elements of diversity were met was 
of no matter: the attorneys did not comply with the diversity statement 
rule and were therefore ordered to show cause why they should not be 
sanctioned and required to enroll in a continuing education class on 
federal jurisdiction.9 
Judge Terrance Evans concurred in the Court’s opinion on the 
merits, but dissented on the issue of attorney sanctions:  
 
I decline to join the court's stinging criticism of the attorneys 
regarding their less-than-perfect jurisdictional statements. Sure, 
the plaintiffs should have said the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000, not that it is $75,000. And sure, both sides 
stumbled on their declarations regarding the dual citizenship of 
the corporate defendants. But, at best, these are low 
misdemeanors; yet the court treats them like felonies. . .I would 
not issue an order to show cause, and I certainly would not 
suggest that an appropriate sanction might be to compel the 
lawyers' attendance at “a continuing legal education class on 
federal jurisdiction.”10   
 
 Are the justices of the Seventh Circuit simply being “fusspots 
and nitpickers”? Or do Federal Appellate Courts on the whole treat 
rule-breaking attorneys in a similar manner? Simply examining a 
small sample of Seventh Circuit cases and analyzing the Court’s 
rationale for sanctioning attorneys would not effectively answer Judge 
Posner’s question, as too many variables exist from case to case. 
Instead, the court’s tendency to issue sanctions is more appropriately 
                                                 
8 Id. at 677-78 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 682. 
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analyzed and discussed by empirically comparing it to the rest of the 
Federal Courts of Appeal. 
By undertaking an empirical survey of Seventh Circuit’s dockets 
and decisions which impose sanctions on attorneys for failure to 
comply with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Seventh 
Circuit’s local rules and comparing the results to similar surveys of the 
federal courts of appeal as a whole, this note will provide an empirical 
answer to Judge Posner’s question. Part I describes the power of the 
federal courts to issue sanctions and discipline attorneys for failure to 
follow local and federal rules. Part II lays out the parameters of the 
empirical research, including both the rationale for the data collection 
and the methodology. Part III presents the results by comparing the 
types and frequency of sanctions issued by the Seventh Circuit and the 
U.S. courts of appeals collectively. Part IV will further discuss the data 
on attorney sanctions and discipline through a comparison of a specific 
appellate court’s composition by political party of appointing 
President.   
 
I. THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS 
 
Federal appellate courts have extensive power to sanction or 
discipline attorneys for misbehavior before the court. This power has 
been manifested in various statutory rules, most importantly Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 46. Rule 46 provides:  
 
(b) Suspension or Disbarment. 
 (1) Standard. A member of the court's bar is subject to 
suspension or disbarment by the court if the member: 
(A) has been suspended or disbarred from practice in 
any other court; or 
(B) is guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the 
court's bar. 
(2) Procedure. The member must be given an 
opportunity to show good cause, within the time prescribed 
by the court, why the member should not be suspended or 
disbarred. 
37 
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(3) Order. The court must enter an appropriate order 
after the member responds and a hearing is held, if 
requested, or after the time prescribed for a response 
expires, if no response is made. 
 
(c) Discipline. A court of appeals may discipline an 
attorney who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a 
member of the bar or for failure to comply with any court 
rule. First, however, the court must afford the attorney 
reasonable notice, an opportunity to show cause to the 
contrary, and, if requested, a hearing.11 
 
Thus, Rule 46 allows a court of appeal to discipline attorneys who 
practice before it for “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” or 
for failure to comply with any court rule or order.12 Because the 
“conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” standard in Rule 46 is so 
broad, courts have pointed out several factors that will be considered 
in determining whether disciplining an attorney is appropriate: 
 
[A] Court of Appeals carefully examines the circumstances 
of the particular situation, keeping in mind that the purpose 
of imposing sanctions is to protect litigants and possible 
future clients from further misfeasance, and deter other 
members of the bar from doing the same, and also 
considers the effect of the sanction on the individual 
attorneys involved.”13 
 
Because this rule provides appellate court judges very broad 
sanctioning power, the decision to utilize the power is subjective; in 
any given scenario where an attorney fails to comply with a procedural 
                                                 
11 FED. R. APP. P. 46(b), (c). On its face, the rule allows an Appellate Court to 
sanction only a member of that specific court’s bar association. However, “the 
disciplinary power is not limited to attorneys admitted to practice in Court.” Ambati 
v. Reno, 2 F. App’x 500, 501 (7th Cir. 2001).  
12 FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) 
13 Ambati, 2 F. App’x at 501.  
38 
5
Austermuehle: Just a Bunch of Fusspots and Nitpickers? That Pretty Much Sums It
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
rule or a court order, the court may sanction or discipline the 
attorney.14 However, in many instances—especially with respect to 
trivial rule violations—judges refrain from issuing a sanction or an 
order to show cause.15  
Generally, the quality of filings and attorney professionalism 
before any of the federal appellate courts is equivalent. It seems safe to 
assume that the First Circuit’s bar does is not comprised of a 
significant amount of “rule-breakers,” or that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
bar is not comprised of infallible attorneys.  Although this is merely an 
assumption, for the purposes of this research it should be taken at face 
value. By assuming that the quality of any federal bar’s attorneys is 
equal, examining the types and number of disciplinary actions taken 
by any court will reveal the “disciplinary demeanor” of any given 
circuit court of appeals and may conclude that Judge Posner and his 
colleagues actually are just a bunch of “fusspots and nitpickers”. 
 
II. THE SURVEY 
 
A. Methodology 
 
In conducting this empirical research many variables must be 
accounted for. Most important is determining what types of sanctions 
will be included in the empirical data. Attorneys can be sanctioned 
through various means. For example, in Smoot, the attorney was 
admonished in the Court’s opinion on the merits for allegedly 
improper attorney conduct.16 These “written sanctions” will be among 
the data collected included in the survey.17  Further, an appellate court 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 For a real-life illustration of this concept, see Bashman, supra n. 1.  
16 Smoot, 469 F.3d at 677. 
17 However, every opinion issued by the 7th Circuit during the relevant time 
period which discussed sanctioning an attorney had a corresponding docket entry 
which sanctioned or threatened to sanction an attorney. Compare  Smoot, 469 F.3d at 
677 with Smoot v. Mazda Motors of America, No. 01-3006 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2005) 
(Docket Entry of Nov. 29, 2006). Instead of collecting data by searching for 
39 
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will frequently reprimand or threaten to impose a disciplinary action 
on an attorney by issuing an order that explains the allegedly improper 
conduct, and requires the attorney to provide an explanation to the 
court.18 These types of sanctions will be included in the result.  
The methodology of this empirical study will be described in 4 
relevant sections: period and scope, breadth of inquiry, data collection 
methodology, and baseline statistics. 
 
i. Period and Scope 
 
First, the data collection period is a critical step in setting up the 
survey.19 The period of data collection is September 30, 1997 to 
September 29, 2007. There are several reasons for choosing this ten-
year period. First, the Director of the U.S. Courts publishes a Judicial 
Business Report and a Federal Court Management Statistics Report on 
a yearly basis, with data collection ending for each year on September 
30.20 By using these dates, an official report of federal appellate court 
statistics can be relied upon for all baseline appellate filing numbers. 
Further, a 10-year period is sufficiently lengthy to ensure enough 
relevant data but not so lengthy as to represent a sample size which 
reflects a drastically different court composition.  
Additionally, the data collected on attorney sanctions from the 
Seventh Circuit would not be informative on its own. This note will 
compare the results collected from the Seventh Circuit to both the US 
courts of appeal as a whole, as well as to each circuit individually.  
                                                                                                                   
sanctions being discussed in opinions, this study collected data solely from the 
courts’ dockets.   
18 See e.g. Fairley v. Andrews, No. 07-3343(7th Cir. Sep. 27, 2007) ( Docket 
Entry of Nov. 13, 2007); Gabriel v. Bumann, No. 01-3006 (7th Cir. Aug. 1, 2001) 
(Docket Entry of Aug. 16, 2001).   
19 Choosing an overly expansive period of time may nullify the results, as the 
composition of the court has significantly changed over the past quarter century. Too 
short of a period will not provide enough data to be relevant. Therefore, choosing a 
middle ground that provides enough data, and is focused on the basic makeup of the 
court as it sits today, is critical.  
20 See DIRECTOR OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, 
1997-2007, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).. 
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ii. Breadth of Inquiry 
 
The parameters that establish relevant data collection are the most 
important aspect of the study. By failing to include relevant potential 
data points in the survey, too little data may be collected. Over 
expansion of the search or careless search criteria will provide 
irrelevant data. Therefore, determining (a) the types of sanctions that 
will be searched for, and (b) the manner of sanctioning, are the most 
important choices in this study.  
Generally, appellate attorneys can be sanctioned in two forms. 
First, while the case is pending before the court, an attorney can be 
threatened with sanction or discipline. This type of sanction will 
appear in the case docket.21 Second, an attorney can be sanctioned, 
disciplined, or admonished within the court’s written opinion. 
However, only sanctions which appear in the docket will be collected 
in this study.22 
 
a. Sanctions within the Docket 
 
 Because many of the issues that the court has with attorneys 
are resolved before the opinion on the merits is published, the majority 
of a court’s disciplinary or sanctioning function is carried out in pre-
opinion orders and rulings. The empirical data will be collected from 
the courts’ dockets during the relevant time period.  
 A large portion of the disciplinary orders issued by the court 
in the docket are based on an attorney’s failure to comply with a 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure or for failing to comply with a 
previous order issued by the court in that case. Such an order typically 
appears within a docket as follows:  
 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Hicks v. Midwest Transit, No. 06-2186 (7th Cir. April 27, 2006) 
(Docket Entry of Nov. 5, 2007).  
22 See supra note 17.  
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11/28/04 ORDER: BEVERLY M. RUSSELL FOR 
APPELLEE RUSSELL RAU, APPELLEE E. A. STEPP, 
APPELLEE G. L. HERSHBERGER, APPELLEE 
KATHLEEN H. SAWYER, APPELLEE JOHN D. 
ASHCROFT IS DIRECTED, AS COUNSEL, TO 
SHOWCAUSE AS TO WHY DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN PURSUANT TO FED. R. 
APP. P. 46(C), FOR FAILING TO RESPOND TO THE 
COURT'S ORDER OF NOVEMBER 1, 2004.23 
 
 A court will ask why disciplinary action should not be taken 
for a multitude of reasons. Some examples include: “[F]or failing to 
prosecute the appeal”24; “for failing to respond to the court’s order 
[requiring the filing of a supplemental statement of jurisdiction]”25; or 
for failing “to respond to the court’s order [requiring the filing of a 
status report regarding the completion of the transcripts referred to in 
Plaintiffs-Appellant’s Motion.]”26  
The court can issue such an order based on any attorney 
infraction, be it a violation of a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, a 
Circuit Rule, or a previous court order.27 This type of on-the-docket 
disciplinary order will be referred to as a Potential Disciplinary Order. 
Similarly, the court can order an attorney to explain why he or she 
should not be sanctioned based on a wide variety of violations. Such 
an order typically appears within a docket as follows:  
 
08/08/2000 ORDER: COUNSEL FOR THE 
PETITIONERS ARE DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE 
                                                 
23 Allen v. Ashcroft, No. 04-2390 (7th Cir. June 1, 2004) (Docket Entry of 
Nov. 18, 2004). 
24 Essex v. Bd. of Educ., No. 01-3581 (7th Cir. Oct. 1, 2001) (Docket Entry of 
Feb. 28, 2002). 
25 Hicks v. Midwest Transit, No. 06-2186 (7th Cir. April 27, 2006) (Docket 
Entry of Nov. 5, 2007).  
26 Fairley v. Andrews, No. 07-3343(7th Cir. Sep. 28, 2007) (order to show 
cause) (Docket Entry of Nov. 13, 2007).  
27 FED R. APP. P. 46(c).  
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WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED FOR 
PLACING THEMSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE 
THEY WERE UNABLE TO ARGUE ORALLY ON 
BEHALF OF THEIR CLIENTS. [1314774-1] AJM [99-
3211] RESPONSE TO SHOWCAUSE DUE 8/22/00 FOR 
JOHN W. KEARNS. (SQUI)28 
 
Orders requiring an attorney to explain why he or she should not 
be sanctioned29 are based on an even wider variety of issues than a 
Potential Disciplinary Order. Some examples include: “For making a 
frivolous argument in light of Fed. R. App. P. 39(A)(4) and the 
discretion it accords to this court in assessing costs”30; “for [the 
attorney’s] failure to inform us that the board of immigration appeals 
had granted a motion to reopen in this case eight months before we 
issued our opinion”31; for “[filing a] contumacious motion”32; or “for 
filing a frivolous appeal and impugning the integrity of the bankruptcy 
judge in [the] reply brief.”33 
This type of on-the-docket order will be referred to as a Potential 
Sanctioning Order. The court can order an attorney to defend him or 
herself against potential sanctions for any reason that it sees fit.34 
                                                 
28 Ambati v. INS, No. 99-3211 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) (Docket Entry of Dec. 
6, 2000).  
29 Occasionally, instead of asking why an attorney should not be sanctioned, 
the court will ask why he or she should not be penalized. See e.g. Aziz v. Tri-State 
University, No. 99-2866 (7th Cir. Sep. 23, 1999) (Docket Entry of Feb. 2, 2002).  
30 Bean v. WI Bell Inc., No. 03-1983 (7th Cir. April 14, 2003) (Docket Entry 
of  May 27, 2004). 
31 Boctor v. Gonzales, No. 05-2530 (7th Cir. May 26, 2005) (Docket Entry of 
Feb 16, 2007). 
32 Google, Inc. v. Cent. Mfg., Inc., No. 07-1569 (7th Cir. Mar 15, 2007) 
(Docket Entry of  July 25, 2007). 
33 Lester v. Vance, No. 00-3027 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2007) (Docket Entry of  
Mar. 3, 2001).   
34 FED. R. APP. P. 46(c). 
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 A court may also issue an order to show cause to an attorney for a 
potential rule or order violation. Such an order typically appears on the 
docket as follows:  
 
08/24/2006   ORDER: PETITIONERS ARE 
ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE FOR THEIR FAILURE 
TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION TO DISMISS, AS 
ORDERED BY THIS COURT ON AUGUST 1, 2006. THE 
RESPONSE TO THIS ORDER IS DUE BY AUGUST 31, 
2006. [1864839-1] JD [04-3341, 05-2529] (MANK) [04-
3341 05-2529]35 
 
An attorney can be ordered to show cause, for example, for “why 
[he] failed to file a timely response”36 or “why he should not be fined 
$1,000 for his violation of Circuit Rule 30.”37 This type of on-the-
docket disciplinary order will be referred to as an Order to Show 
Cause. 
Although every Order to Show Cause indicates a willingness on 
the part of a given court to exercise its disciplinary function, Orders to 
Show Cause which themselves do not refer to sanctioning or 
disciplining an attorney can be much less serious:  
 
“07/12/1999   SHOW CAUSE ORDER: APLNT 
HAS FAILED TO PAY TO THE CLERK OF THIS 
COURT THE REQUISITE DOCKETING FEE. 
PETITIONER IS DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE 
WITHIN 15 DAYS, WHY THIS APPEAL SHOULD NOT 
BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE [99-
2697]”38 
                                                 
 
36 Berinde v. Gonzales, No. 06-1109 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2006) (Docket Entry of 
Apr. 18, 2006).  
37 Normand v. Orkin Exterminating, No. 98-4111 (7th Cir. Dec. 7, 1998) 
(Docket Entry of Oct.12, 1999).  
38 Argueta-Martinez v. INS, No. 99-2697 (8th Cir. June 18, 1999) (Docket 
Entry of July 12, 2004).  
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 In many instances, these types of procedural Orders to Show 
Cause seem to be automatically exercised. If an appellant fails to pay 
the court’s fees, the case can be dismissed on procedural grounds, and 
an Order to Show Cause is the court’s preferred method of doing so.39  
Therefore, for purposes of studying the results of the survey, data 
can be sorted based on whether the court is threatening a sanction or 
discipline and when the court is issuing an order to show cause for a 
litigant’s procedural default or other rule violation. Both types of data 
will be collected, but focusing specifically on the serious instances of 
sanctions and disciplinary threats may provide an alternate picture of 
how willing a specific court is to voluntarily exercise its disciplinary 
authority. 
It would be nearly impossible to search the courts’ dockets based 
on particular Federal Appellate Rules or Circuit Rules and retrieve 
relevant data, as each appellate court has different Circuit rules and 
applications of those rules. Additionally, potential sanctions or 
disciplinary actions based on an attorney’s failure to comply with an 
order issued by the court earlier in the case would be impossible to 
find. By focusing the search on the court’s language and method in 
issuing sanctions or potential sanctions (i.e. requesting an attorney to 
prepare a statement as to why he or she should not be sanctioned), as 
opposed to searching the dockets for the underlying rule upon which 
the sanction is based, relevant data can be collected across every 
circuit. 
The relevant data to be collected from the appellate courts’ 
dockets is therefore comprised of Potential Disciplinary Orders, 
Potential Sanctioning Orders, and Orders to Show Cause.  
 
iii. Data Collection Methodology 
 
With the desired criteria selected, the next step is performing a 
search which will effectively yield the data. The overall search is 
comprised of various individual searches, and all results are cross-
                                                 
39 See Id. 
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referenced to eliminate double-counting. Because Westlaw provides 
access to every federal court’s dockets (and, unlike PACER, is free of 
charge for a law student), all searches were conducted through 
Westlaw.  
 
A. Potential Disciplinary Orders 
 
1. Search 1: [“DISCIPLIN! ACTION SHOULD NOT BE 
TAKEN” or “DISCIPLIN! ACTION WILL BE TAKEN”] 
 a. Rationale: The most frequently used language in issuing 
this type of order is “Attorney for litigant X must submit Y arguing 
‘WHY DISCIPLINARY ACTION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN’”. 
Occasionally, the court will phrase the order “Attorney for litigant X 
must submit Y or ‘DISCIPLINARY ACTION WILL BE TAKEN’”. 
The search query accounts for both variants. Additionally, the root 
expander (!) accounts for any variation on the word disciplinary, i.e. 
disciplining. 
 
2. Search 2: [“SHOULD NOT BE DISCIPLIN!”]  
 a. Rationale: Often (but not as frequently as in Search 1), the 
docket entry will read “Attorney for litigant X must do Y explaining 
‘WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE DISCIPLINED FOR Z.’”  
 
B. Potential Sanctioning Orders 
 
1. Search 1: [“SHOULD NOT BE SANCT!” or “SHOULD NOT 
SANCT!”] 
 a. Rationale: The most frequently used language in issuing 
this type of order is “Attorney for litigant X must submit Y arguing 
why he/she ‘SHOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED for Z’”. 
Occasionally, the court will phrase the order “Attorney for litigant X 
must submit Y arguing why the Court ‘SHOULD NOT SANCTION 
him/her for Z’”. The search query accounts for both variants. 
Additionally, the root expander (!) accounts for any variation on the 
word sanction. 
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2. Search 2: [“46(c)”] 
 a. Rationale: Often, a court’s docket will mention the specific 
Rule under which the Court has the authority to sanction an attorney. 
Although many of the results contained in this search are captured in 
Search 1, there is a significant number which are not, and the search is 
therefore necessary.  
 
3. Search 3: [“SANCT! RESPONSE” or “SANCT! 
STATEMENT”] 
 a. Rationale: In some instances, the Court will issue a 
directive to an attorney warning of potential sanctions without using 
the phrases contained in Search 1, or mentioning the law (contained in 
Search 2). However, in these instances the court will direct the 
attorney to provide the court with a sanction response or a sanction 
statement. This search captures both variations.  
 
4. Search 4: [“SHOULD NOT BE PENAL!” or “SHOULD NOT 
PENAL!”] 
 a. Rationale: Occasionally the court will substitute penalized 
for sanctioned. This search captures the few instances in which courts 
use these alternate phrasings.  
 
C. Orders to Show Cause 
 
 1. Search 1: [“ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE”] 
 a. Rationale: The most frequently used language in issuing 
this type of order is “Attorney for litigant X is ‘ORDERED TO SHOW 
CAUSE’ why he/she did Z’”.  
 
2. Search 2: [“DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE” or “DIRECT! /4 
SHOW CAUSE”] 
 a. Rationale: Sometimes the court will substitute the word 
directed for ordered. This also allows the court to phrase the order “the 
court DIRECTS attorney Y to SHOW CAUSE for Z”. Using the /4 
requires the word directed (or directs, directing, etc.) to occur within 4 
words of the phrase show cause. Because the order usually only reads 
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“directs NAME to show cause” or “directs ATTORNEY FOR NAME 
to show cause,” this search will catch all instances of this language.  
 
iv. Baseline Statistics 
  
In order to determine the relative frequency of attorney sanctions 
in the Seventh Circuit, the results must be compared with the results of 
the federal appellate courts as a whole, as well as with the circuits 
individually. The baseline data to which the collected data is compared 
is provided in this chart40: 
 
Table 1:  
Appeals Filed by Circuit 
 
Circuit 
Appeals 
Filed 
  
1 18426 
2 62288 
3 42193 
4 54081 
5 93331 
6 53583 
7 37956 
8 35667 
9 128423 
10 29332 
11 77253 
DC Cir 15110 
 
 
                                                 
40 See DIRECTOR OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 20. 
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PART II: RESULTS41 
  
A. Finding 1: The Seventh Circuit exercises its disciplinary function 
at the fourth-highest rate of any Federal Appellate Court.  
 
During the ten-year period between September 29, 1997 and 
September 30, 2007, the Seventh Circuit disciplined, sanctioned, or 
ordered an attorney to show cause for a rule violation in 1,007 cases, 
which equates to a ratio of 26.53 sanctions per 1,000 appeals filed. 
The court that exercised its disciplinary function the most frequently 
was the Eighth Circuit, which did so in 2,315 cases, and which equates 
to a ratio of 64.91 sanctions per 1,000 appeals filed. The Sixth Circuit 
was the least likely to exercise its disciplinary function – it did so only 
36 times, which equates to .67 sanctions per 1,000 appeals filed. The 
following table provides the total number of sanctions issued by each 
Federal Circuit, as well as the ratio of sanctions per 1,000 appeals 
filed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 After collecting the data, there were many instances of cases that appeared in 
two or more searches. For example, this could occur when a docket entry such as 
“Petitioner is ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplined for . . .” This 
docket entry would have been retrieved under more than one search. Therefore, in 
order to prevent any case from being counted twice, I sorted through all cases 
collected in the survey and removed any instances a case being returned more than 
once. 
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Table 2: 
Total Sanctions and Ratios by Circuit 
 
Circuit 
Number of 
Sanctions Appeals Filed Per 1000 
    
1 766 18426 41.57169 
2 92 62288 1.47701 
3 239 42193 5.664447 
4 106 54081 1.960023 
5 61 93331 0.653588 
6 36 53583 0.671855 
7 1007 37956 26.53072 
8 2315 35667 64.90594 
9 624 128423 4.858943 
10 141 29332 4.807037 
11 75 77253 0.970836 
DC Cir 846 15110 55.98941 
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Graph 1:  
Total Sanctions and Ratios by Circuit 
 
 
 
B. Finding 2: The Seventh Circuit issues “serious” sanctions or 
disciplinary orders at the highest rate of any Federal Appellate Court.  
 
Based on the differing values equated to each type of docket entry 
described in Part II (B), the Seventh Circuit issued the most Potential 
Disciplinary Orders or Potential Sanctioning Orders.” Disregarding all 
instances of Orders to Show Cause, the Seventh Circuit exercised its 
sanctioning authority in 824 cases, which equates to a ratio of 21.71 
sanctions per 1,000 appeals filed. The Eleventh Circuit was the least 
likely to issue serious sanctions, doing so in 10 cases, which equates to 
a ratio of .13 sanctions per 1,000 cases filed. The following table 
(Table 2) provides the total number of serious sanctions issued by each 
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Federal Circuit, as well as the ratio of sanctions per 1,000 appeals 
filed.  
 
Table 3: 
“Serious” Sanctions and Ratios by Circuit 
 
Circuit 
"Potential 
y 
"Potential 
 
Total 
Appeals Per 1,000 Disciplinar
Order" 
Sanctioning
Order" Filed Appeals 
1 3 5 6 69 8 1842 0.4341
2 7 2 38 5 62288 0.561906 
3 1 31 32 42193 0.75842 
4 0 99 99 54081 1.830587 
5 25 12 37 93331 0.396438 
6 0 26 26 53583 0.485229 
7 65 1 89 65 24 37956 21.70935 
8 102 1 103 35667 2.887823 
9 14 20 15 219 28423 1.705302 
10 58 21 79 29332 2.693304 
11 0 10 10 77253 0.129445 
DC Cir 0 14 14 15110 0.926539 
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Graph 2: 
“Serious” Sanctions and Ratios by Circuit 
 
 
 
 
PART IV: POLITICAL CORRELATION 
 
Finding 3: There is a statistically significant correlation between 
  
ting the data and studying the results we investigated 
whe
 to 
re 
likely that the court is to sanction attorneys.  
C. 
the composition of a given appellate court—based on the nominating 
President’s political party—and that court’s propensity to exercise its 
disciplinary function 
After collec
ther any correlations could be drawn from the quantitative data. It 
appears there is a statistically significant correlation between the 
political composition of a given appellate court and its propensity
sanction or discipline an attorney before it. Generally, the more 
Republican-appointed judges serve on an appellate court, the mo
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 In order to compare the data collected on sanctions and 
disciplinary actions to the political composition of an appellate court a 
num rica  so, 
te 
ate 
Judicial Composition of Circuit – Based on Political Party of Appointing 
President: September 30, 1997 through September 29, 2007 
e l standard was developed to make the comparison. To do
a graph of each judge who has sat on an appellate court during the 
relevant ten-year time frame was prepared and then a calculation of 
calculated the length of their tenure on the court was used to compu
a political quotient of each appellate court based on the number of 
months each political party’s candidates have served on the court.42  
The table below reflects the composition of each federal appell
court based on the nominating President’s political party.  
 
Table 443: 
 
 Republican Democrat
1 68.18% 31.82%
2 35.97% 64.03%
3 59.44% 40.56%
4 58.70% 41.30%
5 67.08% 32.92%
6 49.66% 50.34%
7 63.64% 36.36%
8 73.73% 26.27%
9 64.34% 35.66%
10 58.59% 41.41%
11 57.36% 42.64%
DC Cir 58.72% 41.28%
                                                 
42 Frequently, seats on an appellate court are left vacant for extended periods of 
time. When computing the political quotient of a given court, vacancies were treated 
as if they did not exist during the time they were vacant.  
43 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/ca_frm!OpenFrameSet 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2008). 
54 
21
Austermuehle: Just a Bunch of Fusspots and Nitpickers? That Pretty Much Sums It
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
 
The political quotient of each court, was compared to the results 
, the 
 
ue 
Table 5:  
Sanctions / Political Quotient by Circuit (Ranked) 
 
Circuit Sanctions Per 1000 Appeals Rank 
% 
ublican 
Rank 
 
to the data collected on sanctions. A correlation definitely exists: 
between the greater Republican political quotient of a given court
more likely that court is to exercise its disciplinary function. The most 
Republican influenced court—the Eighth Circuit, where Republican 
judges composed 73% of the court during the relevant 10 year time 
frame—was also the most likely to issue sanctions. The second-most
Republican influenced court—the First Circuit, where Republican 
judges composed 68% of the court—was the third-most likely to iss
sanctions. The chart below provides the compiled data and the graphs 
provide a visual representation of the correlation.  
 
Rep
Appointed 
     
1 41.57 3 68.18% 2 
2 1.48 9 35.97% 12 
3 5.66 5 59.44% 6 
4 1.96 8 58.70% 8 
5 0.65 12 67.08% 3 
6 0.67 11 49.66% 11 
7 26.53 4 63.64% 5 
8 64.91 1 73.73% 1 
9 4.86 6 64.34% 4 
10 4.81 7 58.59% 9 
11 0.97 1 10 0 57.36%
DC 5Cir 5.99 2 58.72% 7 
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Graph 3:  
Sanctions / Political Quotient by Circuit (Ranked) 
 
 
Graph 4:  
Sanctions / Political Quoti nt by Circuit (Raw Data) 
 
e
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Although there are a few circuits that do not conform to the 
general rule—most notably, the Fifth Circuit—there is a general, 
positive correlation between the amount of Republican President 
appointed judges that sit on a given appellate court and its propensity 
to use its disciplinary power.  
Statisticians use a tool called the Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation Coefficient (Pearson’s Correlation) in order to assess the 
strength of a particular apparent correlation.44 Pearson's Correlation is 
a way of summarizing the strength of a linear relationship between 
two variables with a single figure that ranges between 1 and +1. The 
stronger the relationship between the variables, the closer the 
correlation figure is to ±1.45 
The two variables in this case are sanctions per 1000 cases filed 
and percent Republican appointees. A high positive Pearson’s 
orrelation in this case would indicate that as the percentage of 
ep
ge of 
 
C
R ublican appointees increased on a given appellate court, the 
number of sanctions issued by that court would increase. A high 
negative Pearson’s Correlation would indicate that as the percenta
Republican appointees increased, the number of sanctions would 
decrease. A low Pearson’s Correlation would indicate that there is not 
a strong relationship between the two variables.  
The Pearson’s Correlation between sanctions per 1000 cases filed
and percent Republican appointees is 0.515, which represents a 
statistically significant correlation at a 90% alpha level (or 
probability).46  
                                                 
44 JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION 
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 27-28  (3d ed. 2003). 
45 In order to illustrate the meaning of the Pearson Product Moment 
Coefficient, an example is helpful: the Pearson’s Correlation between “foot size” and 
“heig
be low.  
003). 
ally 
ht” in a sample of human beings would be high, while the Pearson’s 
Correlation between “foot size” and “individual net worth” would 
46 MARK SIRKIN, STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 507 (3d ed. 2
Alpha Level represents the statistician’s “willingness to be wrong.” Id. On the most 
basic level, a 90% alpha level signifies that the probability that the statistic
significant correlation has occurred by chance is 10%. Id. In social science studies, 
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58 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By examining the empirical data on each federal court of app
the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to issue sanctions or exercise its
disciplinary power can be seen. The Seventh Circuit issued the fourth-
most sanctions overall and issued the most serious sanctions. In th
end, the data suggests that the Seventh Circuit may be “nitpicking” to 
a certain degree, but that there are other circuits th
eals, 
 
e 
at are nearly as 
criti
cal 
resident’s 
and its propensity to exercise its disciplinary function. 
Although the data does not indicate any cause/effect relationship, it is 
interesting and may warrant additional research.   
  
cal of attorneys.  
Additionally, the data shows a correlation between the politi
composition of any given court—based on the appointing P
political party—
                                                                                                                 
an alpha level of 90% is acceptable. In “hard science” studies, an alpha level of 95% 
is acceptable, but more commonly a 99% alpha level is used. Id. 
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